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*Crim. L.R. 889 Summary:
This article explores the implications for human rights of retaining a person's DNA when there has
been no conviction in the courts. The right to privacy, the presumption of innocence and the interest in
not being stigmatised by the State are considered in turn, to determine if they pose a challenge to the
retention of an innocent person's genetic material.
Introduction
The collection of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) from crime scenes and individuals is seen universally
as an intrinsic part of effective criminal investigation and prosecution. The benefits of gathering and
comparing DNA samples are manifold: suspects may be more readily and speedily identified,
innocent persons may be ruled out and the wrongfully convicted exonerated, while the enhanced
likelihood of detection may deter some would-be criminal actors. Despite these factors, across the
world there is little consistency legally and theoretically as to whose DNA should be obtained by the
State and for how long it should be kept. Ongoing storage of DNA, regardless of the consequence of
a specific criminal investigation or prosecution, allows State agents to home in on the population of
the DNA repository rather than requiring genetic testing of specific individuals for each police enquiry.
In other words, DNA retention provides a potential avenue for investigating or resolving crimes that an
individual on the database is yet to commit. Thus, on the face of it, expanding the reach of DNA
databases to the greatest degree possible is understandable in an investigative and policing sense,
even where this is not predicated on criminal conviction.
The debate about DNA in criminal justice is configured around certain human rights and civil liberties,
and while collection of genetic material on the one hand and retention on the other overlap in respect
of their consequences they raise slightly different issues. This article will concentrate solely on DNA
retention, and in particular on an issue that is difficult to resolve in a rights sense, namely the storage
of DNA notwithstanding the results of the relevant investigation or prosecution. Given that suspected
but unconvicted individuals lie at the boundary *Crim. L.R. 890 of what is currently permitted
regarding the keeping of genetic material, this group of unconvicted suspects and the policies
associated with it represent the focus of this article. Rather than reiterating the science of DNA, the
technology of DNA profiling, its significance in criminal investigations, its probative value or
associated evidential problems (which have been ably assessed elsewhere1 ), here I seek to tease
out the human rights implicated by the retention of unconvicted adults' DNA, and to determine the
persuasiveness of arguments which contest the legitimacy of this crime control mechanism. I will
examine how the retention of DNA of charged and arrested persons has been conceptualised
jurisprudentially, as this influences whether, when, and to what extent storage is permitted.
While DNA collection from an individual before a criminal trial is not uncontroversial (it affects the
rights to bodily integrity,2 to personal privacy3 and the privilege against self-incrimination4 ), this article
focuses on retention only. The dominant interpretation of DNA retention is that it compromises the
privacy of the individual; however I will show that this right does not provide a barrier to the retention
of DNA, especially if further safeguards are introduced regarding the decision to retain. In addition,
although it has been suggested that the presumption of innocence may be compromised, I will argue
that such analysis is misdirected. Instead of these traditional rationales, I propose a reconsideration of
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DNA retention in terms of the State's stigmatisation of an innocent person without due process, which
is anathema to liberalist principles. This interest in not being stigmatised has been alluded to
tangentially in ECHR case law: here I will elevate it to an argument in its own right, as it represents
the strongest and most persuasive challenge to DNA retention where no conviction follows.
*Crim. L.R. 891 The right to privacy
The right to privacy is that most often cited in relation to DNA retention, given the potential effects on
both personal and informational privacy.5 Personal privacy is relevant due to the exceptional nature of
the genetic material in DNA which determines physical characteristics and traits, genetic disorders,
susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin. An individual's DNA is unique (except in the case of
identical twins) and is inherited from both one's parents. As more similarities may be seen in the DNA
of siblings and family members when compared with unrelated persons, DNA may reveal familial
relationships. Thus, a DNA sample contains a range of intimate personal and family information. In
contrast, a DNA profile, which may be generated from a sample, is a set of identifying characteristics
from regions of DNA that are not known to provide for any physical characteristics or medical
conditions of the person. Moreover, a profile's code may only be read with the aid of technology.
While the storage and use of a DNA profile rather than a DNA sample may mitigate the impact on
personal privacy, both forms affect the right to informational privacy, which is the right to retain control
or at least oversight of data or material taken from or relating to oneself.
Judicial assessment of whether and how non-conviction6 DNA retention impinges on the right to
privacy involves consideration of the populations whose DNA may be kept, the length of time for
which this may last, the nature of DNA when compared with other methods of identification such as
fingerprints, the distinction between DNA samples and profiles, and the governance of DNA
databases.
The effect of DNA retention on privacy has been judged partly by the categories of people whose
DNA may be retained--the more expansive the reach of the database, the more likely it is to breach
the right. Keeping the genetic material of convicted persons has been approved by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and US courts,7 but the situation concerning unconvicted persons is
less clear cut. S and Marper v United Kingdom explored the extent to which such DNA retention
affects the right to privacy under art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which
provides that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence”, and no State interference shall occur except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of factors including the prevention of disorder
or crime.8 S and Marper involved a challenge to the law in England and *Crim. L.R. 892 Wales which
was the most permissive in the common law world as to the populations from whom DNA samples
could be both taken and retained. In England and Wales a non-intimate sample9 could be taken
without consent from a person who has been charged with, informed that he will be reported for, or
convicted of a recordable offence,10 and he need not be in police custody.11 Such samples are kept
indefinitely, regardless of the consequences of the investigation or subsequent criminal trial.12 In the
domestic setting, the Court of Appeal had upheld the unsuccessful judicial review of the decision to
collect and retain DNA from S (an acquitted child) and Marper (an adult against whom proceedings
were not initiated) on the grounds that the risks to the individual were not great and were outweighed
by the benefits of retention. The House of Lords dismissed their appeal, finding that there was no
breach of art.8 but that if such a breach had occurred it constituted minor interference only, and
moreover that retention was proportionate to its aims. However, the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg
held that this “blanket and indiscriminate” retention of DNA violated art.813 and favoured limiting
non-conviction retention to serious suspected offences, noting in particular the Scottish approach.14
DNA may be collected in Scotland from a person who has been arrested and is in custody or detained
on suspicion of having committed an offence punishable by imprisonment,15 that is, a slightly narrower
range of persons than in England and Wales. However, what is more notable in the context of this
article is the general rule in Scotland of destruction of samples and information derived from them
following a decision not to institute criminal proceedings or when proceedings do not end with
conviction.16 DNA retention is allowed after prosecutions which do not lead to conviction for certain
sexual or violent offences only.17 The Grand Chamber approved of this scheme, indicating cautious
support for non-conviction DNA databases per se, albeit with more restrictive population *Crim. L.R.
893 policies than in England. Nevertheless, besides endorsement of the Scottish legislation, no
indication was given as to what thresholds would be permissible to ensure compliance with the
privacy concerns of the European Court.
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In addition to directly relevant ECHR jurisprudence, it is instructive to look to the alternative privacy
arguments propounded in the United States to see how this right is conceptualised. Though the US
Supreme Court has not yet accepted a case challenging the storage of DNA, privacy concerns have
been raised in State and federal circuit courts. In contrast to England and Wales, DNA is collected
from a circumscribed range of people in the United States18 : the federal DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 200019 authorised DNA sampling from individuals in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons who were convicted of serious offences, such as homicide, sexual abuse or exploitation,
kidnapping, robbery and burglary; this was extended by the USA Patriot Act of 2001 to include
terrorism-related crimes20 and by the Justice for All Act of 2004 to cover all felonies, violent and
sexual crimes.21 Although some states such as South Dakota and Louisiana have permitted DNA
collection from arrestees since the end of the 1990s, arrestee samples could not be uploaded to the
national database until the DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005 amended the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 by requiring DNA sample collection by US agencies “from individuals who are
arrested or from non-U.S. persons who are detained under the authority of the United States”.22 In
addition, a sizeable minority of states now have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling, although
this pertains to felonies or offences punishable by a minimum period of imprisonment only.23 No state
currently permits sampling from all persons charged with or arrested for suspected recordable or
imprisonable offences, as is the case in both Scotland and England and Wales.
In US case law DNA retention is somewhat conflated with DNA collection: nevertheless it is still useful
to outline the arguments as these often represent implicit approval of ongoing retention. The
compulsory extraction of blood for DNA profiling has been viewed as constituting a “search” as it
affects the “reasonable expectation of privacy”,24 thus bringing the procedure within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment which requires all searches and seizures to be reasonable.25 Constitutional
jurisprudence has refined the parameters of this Amendment to provide that although a search or
seizure must usually be conducted with a warrant and with probable cause, it may still be reasonable
if obtaining a *Crim. L.R. 894 warrant was impractical, if individualised suspicion exists, or where a
“special need” that goes beyond normal law enforcement purposes was present.26 The court may also
invoke a general balancing approach, the “totality of circumstances” test, which sets the State interest
against that of the individual to determine the reasonableness of the search “by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 27 Every court which has
analysed the federal or equivalent state statutes permitting collection and analysis of DNA from
convicted persons has upheld them as compliant with the Fourth Amendment,28 but there is less
consistency regarding the position of unconvicted individuals in state courts. For the most part, the
general balancing test has been applied to uphold the collection of DNA samples from persons
arrested for violent felonies on the basis that it entails a minimal privacy intrusion, and because of the
diminished expectation of privacy of arrestees when compared with the general population and the
compelling interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool.29 However, in Friedman v Boucher and Luzaich
the Ninth Circuit found that the sampling of an arrestee was in breach of the Fourth Amendment.30
Neither the special needs test nor the general balancing test validated DNA collection: the former did
not apply since the only government interest in taking DNA was “to help solve ‘cold cases’ … clearly a
normal law enforcement function”, and the search was not reasonable on a balancing approach as
the only limitation permitted on pre-trial detainees' right to be free from suspicionless searches was
for prison security.31
While most State courts have approved of pre-trial DNA collection because of the limited invasion of
privacy, it is noteworthy that ongoing retention is rarely unravelled from its initial acquisition in the
United States. Harlan points out that such a distinction was made in Skinner v Railway Labor
Executives' Association 32 where the taking of a biological sample for a drugs test and its subsequent
analysis were seen as discrete events requiring independent Fourth Amendment scrutiny.33 However
in Haskell and Ento v Brown the Court rejected the claim that “running an individual's DNA profile
against other DNA profiles in order to inculpate that individual in a crime … is a second, unreasonable
search” 34 and held that the *Crim. L.R. 895 subsequent “search” is merely the matching of a
legitimately-obtained DNA profile against other DNA profiles in a database rather than a more
invasive search of the original sample.35 This demonstrates that the jurisprudence on DNA collection
concerning its apparently minimal privacy intrusion is also relevant for retention, given that the same
analysis and justifications are deemed to apply.
Thus, it appears that the ECHR protects a richer or deeper conception of privacy constructed around
a person's ability to live privately and to have dominion over personal material taken from his body,
whereas the Fourth Amendment does not seem capable of extending to cover protracted retention of
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DNA. Nevertheless, the right to privacy under the ECHR does not preclude retention of arrestees'
DNA as long as it occurs for certain suspected offences and categories of suspects only. However, it
is not clear that the more serious the suspected offence, the more we should permit incursions on the
individual's rights pre-trial.36 The legitimacy of a crime control tactic should be judged in terms of its
consequences for individual rights, rather than the severity of the suspected crime.
DNA retention may be further justified in the face of privacy arguments by the assertion that genetic
material is akin to fingerprint data. US courts in Anderson v Virginia and United States v Pool upheld
the collection of DNA samples from persons arrested for violent felonies on the basis that it was
equivalent to the taking of fingerprints,37 but did not explore whether the retention of both is
comparable. In Van der Velden v The Netherlands the ECtHR distinguished cellular material from
fingerprints given the use to which the former could be put in future, given possible advances in
science.38 Similarly, in S and Marper the Grand Chamber was careful to differentiate fingerprints and
cellular samples and analysed them separately, emphasising legitimate concern about potential use
and the highly personal nature of the latter.39 The Chamber followed Van der Velden (and Baroness
Hale who dissented in the House of Lords) in concluding that systematic retention of DNA samples
interfered with the right to respect for private life, given the nature and amount of information in such
samples. This line of thought is also evident in United States v Mitchell where the court viewed the
search in this instance as one that reveals the most intimate details of an individual's genetic
condition and felt that while the taking of the sample may not be intrusive the searching of it may be
so.40 This is one of the few times in US jurisprudence that a distinction is made between DNA
collection and subsequent comparisons, although little attention is paid to retention on its own. The
degree to which DNA differs from fingerprints in terms of the depth and potential use of the material
underlines that a different privacy paradigm must be applied, and indeed this rightly contributed to the
finding of certain US courts and the Grand Chamber.
Whether DNA is held as a sample or profile may also be relevant to privacy. As previously outlined, a
wider range of intimate genetic information may be gleaned from the former, while a DNA profile is a
set of identifying characteristics *Crim. L.R. 896 from areas of DNA that do not reveal a person's
physical traits or medical conditions. Moreover, a DNA profile consists of 20 numbers and a gender
indicator and thus may only be read with the aid of technology.41 The distinction between samples
and profiles was stressed by the UK Government in S and Marper given that a person is
unidentifiable from a profile to the untrained eye. The Chamber accepted the difference between
samples and profiles but felt that retention of the latter still interferes with art.8, given the “substantial
amounts of unique personal data” in profiles, including information about familial relationships and
ethnic origin.42
One aspect of DNA retention and privacy not considered fully in extant jurisprudence is the status of
databases as techniques of surveillance and the systems of governance which are thus warranted:
DNA databases have been described as “mass surveillance” as they are not targeted at any specific
individual but store images and information from a wider population for possible future use.43
However, the existing DNA databases in the United Kingdom and United States are not mass
surveillance in the sense of CCTV which is not discerning with regard to who it monitors. Thus, DNA
databases fall into an interim category by retaining information on a mass scale of certain targeted
categories of people, premised on the perceived risk they pose. Previously, the ECtHR has found that
where there is state surveillance of an individual, supervisory control ideally should come from judicial
officers,44 but other arrangements have been deemed to be acceptable if “independent of the
authorities carrying out the surveillance, and … vested with sufficient powers and competence to
exercise an effective and continuous control”.45 For example, in Leander v Sweden a police register of
confidential personal information used to assess candidates for positions critical to national security
was legitimate despite the lack of court intervention, based on supervision from independent
parliament sources and when the interest in protecting national security was balanced against the
seriousness of the interference with privacy.46 In contrast, although there was judicial oversight of
phone tapping in Kruslin v France the quality of the law was not sufficient for the surveillance to be in
accordance with law.47 If we draw an analogy, it appears that judicial involvement is required at an
earlier stage of the DNA retention process in order to safeguard the right to privacy unless adequate
alternative supervision is provided. Oversight of the UK's National DNA Database (NDNAD) is
provided by the NDNAD Strategy Board, comprising members from the Association of Chief Police
Officers, the Home Office, the National Policing Improvement Agency, the Association of Police
Authorities, the Human Genetics Commission and the Information Commissioner's Office,48 but the
original decision about inclusion on the databases in England and Wales is purely a police matter.
While initially retention in Scotland is also contingent *Crim. L.R. 897 on police judgment,49 the
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approval of a sheriff is required for extension of the time frame for unconvicted persons.50 This line of
argument was not explored in S and Marper but the absence of judicial approval for DNA retention of
suspects is significant for privacy. Retaining personal biological material may not be conceptually
equivalent to the State monitoring one's phone calls, given the greater direct intrusion of the latter;
nevertheless, the degree and depth of personal and familial information contained in DNA indicates
that judicial or other independent oversight is warranted to safeguard an individual's privacy. Indeed,
central to the court's decision in United States v Pool in balancing the competing interests was the
“judicial involvement” or grand jury determination of probable cause before DNA testing.51
The duration of retention is also relevant to personal privacy. In England, DNA of all persons charged
with or reported for a recordable offence could be collected and stored indefinitely, and though an
application could be made to the relevant police force for removal of DNA from the database this
rarely was granted.52 This was seen to be disproportionate with respect to the law's aims by the
Nuffield Council on Bioethics,53 and such concerns were translated into robust legal criticism in S and
Marper. The Grand Chamber extolled the virtues of the Scottish measures under which indefinite
retention of DNA from unconvicted persons is not allowed per se; according to s.18A(4) of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 the destruction date is three years following the conclusion of
proceedings and a sheriff may extend this for no more than two years,54 but nothing prevents
recurring police applications to amend further the destruction date. Furthermore, non-conviction
retention is permitted only when proceedings have been instituted and have not resulted in conviction
rather than after arrest or charge. S and Marper prompted a lengthy consultation process by the
Home Office, characterised by a seeming reluctance to amend the law relating to the duration of
retention.55 A more restrictive model has been constructed by the Crime and Security Act 2010,
providing renewable retention periods of between three and six years depending on the age of the
suspect and the gravity of the alleged offence. However, this Act has not been implemented, and the
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition now intends to move to the Scottish approach by means of
the Freedom (Great Repeal) Bill.56
The right to privacy appears to be the dominant barrier to the retention of unconvicted persons' DNA,
and thus art.8 and the Fourth Amendment form the basis of most jurisprudence on this issue. The
scope of DNA retention in a population and temporal sense, the unique quality of DNA and the
governance of databases are relevant in determining if the encroachment on privacy is justifiable.
Restricting retention to persons suspected of serious offences is understandable at *Crim. L.R. 898
first glance but is not sustainable in a rights' sense given that the gravity of the offence does not
increase the likelihood of their guilt nor of re-offending. While imposing a threshold such as this
reduces the population whose right to privacy is limited, this is not the approach advocated here.
Instead, concerns about privacy may be addressed adequately by more rigorous mechanisms of
governance, by requiring judicial approval to retain cellular material, and by delineating a maximum
period of storage.
The presumption of innocence
Having dismissed the apparent challenge posed to DNA retention by the right to privacy, the
presumption of innocence will now be examined. The retention of the DNA of unconvicted persons
speaks to the State's suspicion of their likelihood to (re-)offend, and thus distinguishes them from
“truly” innocent people who have not come to the attention of the police. It entrenches an interim
categorisation of suspicion which adheres to individuals once they have come to be charged or
arrested, evident in the differential treatment accorded in the storage of their cellular material. In
broad terms, this may compromise the precept that everyone should be presumed innocent by the
State, by keeping the DNA of legally innocent persons on a database which is otherwise populated by
convicted persons. While the schemes in place in Scotland and the United States narrow the range of
relevant unconvicted persons, this does not mitigate the effect on those who remain included in the
database.
Thus, DNA retention appears to impinge on the presumption of innocence, and indeed this point has
been argued in a number of cases in the Strasbourg court, although consideration has been
somewhat oblique. While such an argument was raised in W v The Netherlands the application was
deemed to be inadmissible, and in Van der Velden v The Netherlands the court felt that inclusion in
the database may in fact benefit the applicant by excluding him from the list of suspects of a crime for
which there is DNA evidence, rather than casting doubt on his innocence.57 In S and Marper, the
applicants claimed that retention casts suspicion on unconvicted persons implying that they were not
“wholly innocent”.58 Although in the domestic setting the Court of Appeal asserted that a constable
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could destroy DNA evidence if the person were free from “any taint of suspicion”,59 the ECtHR
expressed concern that unconvicted persons, who “are entitled to the presumption of innocence, are
treated in the same way as convicted persons”.60 This factor underpinned its final judgment on art.8,
demonstrating that any analysis of the “presumption of innocence”, as specifically alluded to by the
Chamber, was embodied within concerns about privacy.
Similarly, little attention has been paid in the United States to the presumption of innocence per se in
relation to DNA databases. In United States v Pool, when dismissing the claim that DNA collection
breaches procedural due process as protected by the Fifth Amendment, the District Court for the
Eastern District of *Crim. L.R. 899 California noted that the DNA removal procedures in the event of
an exoneration or dismissal of charges ensure that “the risk of an innocent person's DNA being
included in CODIS [the US federal DNA database] is minimal”.61 However, in United States v Mitchell
the court granted the defendant's motion in opposition to the collection of a pre-trial DNA sample,62
and relied on the presumption of innocence in so doing, although this, as in S and Marper, was
inextricably bound up with the right to privacy and concerned collection and the storage that follows
rather than retention specifically. The court stressed the neglect in United States v Pool of “the moral
polestar of our criminal justice system--the presumption of innocence”.63 Moreover, the court
concluded that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee is or was
involved in criminal activity, then a proper warrant may be sought for DNA collection.64
The presumption of innocence, potentially breached by non-conviction databases, formed part of a
corpus of rights developed to establish some semblance of parity between the more vulnerable
individual and the State which is endowed with substantial resources that facilitate the investigation,
detection and prosecution of crime. It is less a reflection of the likely blamelessness of the individual
but rather a recognition of the disparity in power and capabilities between the opposing parties in the
criminal process.65 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the intuitive implication that DNA retention affects a
person's right to be presumed innocent, it is less clear whether the presumption as legally construed
is in fact compromised, thus explaining its relative absence in judicial pronouncements as opposed to
counsels' argument. The presumption of innocence is safeguarded by art.6(2) of the ECHR which
provides that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law” and requires that a court,
“should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the
burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused.”66
In the United States the presumption of innocence is seen to derive from the Fifth Amendment,67 and
the US Supreme Court has described the presumption as “a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice”68 and as “axiomatic and elementary”.69
*Crim. L.R. 900 The key interpretive question regarding the presumption concerns the stage of the
process at which it applies, as this indicates the persons to whom it accrues and the agents of the
State it binds. As Ashworth notes, the scope and meaning of the presumption are “eminently
contestable” given that it may operate at the level of the criminal trial only or in the criminal process
more broadly.70 In this respect Ní Raifeartaigh presents a useful typology of the presumption, where
at one end of the spectrum it has no application pre-trial while at the opposite end it prohibits all
restrictions on the accused's liberty which presuppose that he is guilty.71 The intermediate view is that
it applies at the pre-trial stage but prohibits punishment of the accused for alleged criminal conduct,72
and indeed ECHR case law embodies this view to require that “pre-trial procedures should be
conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were innocent”.73 In the United States, the
presumption is rather more narrowly construed and has been described not as a presumption,
“in the strict sense of the term [but]… simply a rule of evidence which allows the defendant to stand
mute at trial and places the burden upon the government to prove the charges against him beyond a
reasonable doubt.”74
The presumption does not apply to pre-trial proceedings in the United States, rather it,
“allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to
judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of
suspicions.”75
Thus, the presumption of innocence as interpreted in the United States does not pose any challenge
to the retention of arrestees' DNA. Moreover, one could argue that under the ECHR the presumption
in a strict sense cannot apply once a person has been arrested, given that reasonable suspicion of
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involvement in crime is required on the part of the police before the formal mechanisms of the criminal
justice process swing into action.76 Nevertheless, the maintenance of formalised suspicion in the form
of DNA retention may pose problems in a rights sense, given that, unlike the situation in the United
States, the presumption of innocence in ECHR jurisprudence extends beyond a strictly procedural
guarantee to encompass a “reputational” aspect which aims to protect the image of the person.77
However, as Trechsel notes, complex problems surround the application of this element of the
presumption of innocence.78
*Crim. L.R. 901 Judicial decisions or reasoning reflecting an opinion that a person is guilty, such as
requiring him to pay the cost of criminal proceedings and compensation or stating that had a
prosecution not been time-barred it would “very probably have led to … conviction”, breach this
aspect of art.6(2).79 Moreover, where a court expresses suspicion about an acquitted individual
(rather than opining that he is guilty), such as by refusing compensation to him or by saying that
suspicion has not been “dispelled”, the presumption will also have been infringed.80 However,
“[t]he voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is conceivable as long as the
conclusion of criminal proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation.”81
In other words, where criminal proceedings are discontinued, statements which describe a state of
suspicion, as opposed to those which constitute a determination of guilt, are compatible with the
presumption of innocence.82 Furthermore, art.6(2) may be breached by State actors other than the
courts. In Allenet de Ribemont v France, the Minister of the Interior and senior police officers
implicated the applicant in a murder in statements made during a press conference, after the
applicant had been arrested but before trial.83 The court found a breach of art.6(2) on the basis that
this was,
“clearly a declaration of the applicant's guilt which, firstly, encouraged the public to believe him guilty
and, secondly, prejudged the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.”84
Non-conviction DNA retention is not an expression of guilt but may denote suspicion on the part of the
State as to the future criminality of the person and his likelihood of re-offending. However, in S and
Marper the Grand Chamber stated that “the retention of the applicants' private data cannot be
equated with the voicing of suspicions”.85 While this distinction is not explained or explored by the
Chamber, one can speculate that it is the absence of express articulation and dissemination of the
fact of DNA retention which differentiates it from the voicing of suspicion. One could respond that
DNA retention is on a continuum from the latter as it represents State opinion about criminal
tendencies on the part of the charged or acquitted person. If such an analogy is accepted and,
despite the comment of the Grand Chamber, we conceive of State storage of DNA as representing a
type of expression of suspicion, then the presumption of innocence in its reputational sense may be
threatened. However, as may be seen from the text of art.6(2), an individual must be charged before
the presumption is engaged, thus automatically leaving some of the population of the NDNAD beyond
its scope (although not those in the Scottish database). This indicates that the presumption of
innocence as legally defined and construed does not fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of
non-conviction DNA retention.
*Crim. L.R. 902 A further comparison may be drawn between DNA retention and pre-trial detention
after the refusal of bail which also appears to equate an individual with convicted persons. The Bail
Reform Act 1984 in the United States allows bail to be refused if there is clear and convincing
evidence that no condition or combination of pre-trial release will reasonably assure the safety of any
other person and the community, and art.5 of the ECHR permits comparable constraints on the right
to liberty. Indeed, Laudan notes that bail hearings cannot be squared with a broad construal of the
presumption of innocence86 : thus if refusal of bail is permissible surely the less invasive retention of
DNA must be too. Restrictions on the refusal of bail indicate what is appropriate in the context of DNA
retention, given that in both instances the rights of an individual who is legally innocent are being
restricted by virtue of a possible risk of criminality. “Clear and convicting evidence” 87 or “strong and
specific reasons” are required for restraining the defendant's liberty88 on the basis of his presumed
innocence and the rule of respect for individual liberty89 : in other words, each bail case is examined
on its merits unlike the “blanket” retention of DNA without conviction in England and Wales. However,
in contrast to pre-trial detention, and as the UK Government emphasised in S and Marper, there
appears to be no practical consequence of retention for the relevant individual unless his DNA later
matches a crime-scene profile.90 To be sure, the impact on an individual's rights as a result of DNA
retention is more remote and undoubtedly of less immediate effect than the refusal of bail, but the
incursion on freedom of personhood that it entails is no less real. Storing DNA means state retention
Page7
of unique personal data which may also reveal information about familial and genetic relationships
and ethnic origin.91 While the retention of DNA does not compromise liberty in the physical sense, a
similarly cautious approach should be adopted when considering whether DNA should be stored after
acquittal, or when no action at all is taken, given the potential use of DNA and the level of personal
information contained within. Moreover, bail refusal by definition ends on acquittal or the dropping of
charges, whereas DNA retention may not. Given that the refusal of bail follows a court decision,
judicial intervention should similarly be required for the retention of a DNA sample. Nevertheless, the
bail analogy further indicates to us that non-conviction DNA retention is not in breach of the
presumption of innocence as currently conceived of in ECHR jurisprudence, as long as court approval
is required.
A “right” not to be “stigmatised”?
The unease about the presumption of innocence expressed by the Grand Chamber in S and Marper
seemed to conflate its legal interpretation with a normative concern about the interest in not being
stigmatised unnecessarily. As noted above, even the more expansive reputational element of the
presumption, as currently *Crim. L.R. 903 interpreted, would only prohibit DNA retention if we
conceive of retention as a “voicing of suspicion”, and a proportion of the population of the
non-conviction database would still fall beyond its scope. Nevertheless, ongoing storage of DNA,
although based initially on reasonable police belief of involvement in crime, is not in line with the spirit
of the broader interpretation of the presumption of innocence expounded briefly in S and Marper. 92
Indeed, the Chamber may have muddied the waters somewhat by referring to the “presumption”
explicitly.93 I propose to separate this interest from existing legal principles and to characterise it as a
right in not being “stigmatised” by the State.94 This provides the most robust opposition to
non-conviction DNA retention, rather than any argument based on the right to privacy or the
presumption of innocence as it currently stands.95 Protection of this interest would guard against the
generation of a continuum of guilt, where minor incursions on an individual's rights are permitted, as
long as a shade of suspicion remains.
It may be argued, as indeed it was by the UK Government in S and Marper, that there is no stigma in
retention96 as there is no public articulation of suspicion. In response, the Grand Chamber
acknowledged the applicants' “perception that they are not being treated as innocent”.97 The
conception of stigma here is not equivalent to discriminatory treatment,98 but rather the official
labelling of certain people as potentially criminal. Although it could be said that the stigma of DNA
retention is overstated on the basis that an individual would need to divulge his being on the database
for anyone to know, internalisation of a stigmatic label occurs by virtue of his treatment by the State.99
This is what distinguishes this interest from the legal interpretation of the presumption of innocence.
Moreover, it is not inconceivable that a State official or leaked document could reveal a person's
inclusion in the database, thereby compounding the stigma. Nevertheless, public communication
should not be seen a pre-requisite for someone to be stigmatised by the State. Indeed, it is curious
that despite the Grand Chamber's recognition that the maintenance of an arrestee database
stigmatises those whose DNA is retained within, it never engaged with how this could be justified in
relation to the Scottish policy of holding DNA samples from a limited number of prosecuted but
unconvicted individuals. While the circumscribed scheme in Scotland seems compliant with the right
to privacy, it nonetheless has a stigmatising effect on those whose genetic material is retained.
*Crim. L.R. 904 The right in not being stigmatised by the State should be enjoyed by all individuals,
in contrast to the presumption of innocence which accrues only to those charged with a crime.
Recognition of such a right would preclude the formalised entrenchment of a category of suspects
who are subject to increased State intervention because of prior suspicion which led to the initial
arrest. Conceptually speaking, the treatment of a class of suspects in this manner does not cohere
with the underlying ethos of the ECHR. The ECHR permits qualification of some liberties such as is
“necessary in a democratic society”, but as Tadros has stressed this must not compromise
democratic norms.100 As well as requiring signatories to adhere to the precepts of democracy, the
ECHR may be interpreted as enshrining human rights that are liberal in nature.101 While the European
conception of human rights sometimes diverges from the libertarian US model to encompass a more
robust protection of welfare interests, the European and American paradigms may be seen as
comparable in relation to criminal justice specifically, in that due process rights safeguard the
individual in the pursuit of crime control. Thus, the means of tackling criminality in Europe and the
United States must be founded on a liberal conception of the polity in which each person is entitled to
the basic liberties required to realise his entitlement to equal concern and respect,102 and where there
is to the greatest extent possible an absence of external constraints, freedom from unnecessary
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interference and a checked form of government.103 In other words, adherence to the principles of
liberalism militates against the adoption of results-oriented, risk-based policies which undercut the
primacy of the individual and subjugate conventional notions of justice and rights. Therefore, although
the retention of DNA does not transgress the presumption of innocence as legally construed, in a
normative sense it influences how the State views the citizen, or at least certain groups of society,
namely those who come to the attention of the police, notwithstanding the result of subsequent
investigation or prosecution. Retaining the DNA of unconvicted persons represents a shift away from
the classical liberal ethos of negative liberty and minimal interference from the state, in order to
improve the State's capacity to deal with criminality and demonstrates a utilitarian favouring of crime
control tactics. As Cole and Lynch have stated, databases open new realms of suspect identification
whereby the population of the database becomes a “pool of suspects or presuspects” 104 : this is
inimical to the precepts of a liberal society in which strict limits are placed on State powers and in
which individual rights “trump” collective demands or ends.105
Conclusion
The use of DNA in the criminal justice system, in particular its storage in databases, is an uneasy mix
of old and new logics, with the desire for technological advancement intersecting with anti-modern
implications of guilt and of suspect *Crim. L.R. 905 populations. This article sought to unpack the
leading arguments put forward in opposition to the retention of DNA specifically. Examining the rights
engaged by State storage of DNA implies that the sharpest challenge lies in a normative conception
of the avoidance of stigmatisation and the foundational precepts of the liberal state, rather than the
right to privacy or the presumption of innocence which provide the traditional framing for the debate.
Privacy concerns may be addressed by reducing the duration of retention, by requiring judicial
intervention and by improving systems of governance; however none of these measures engage with
the differential treatment of some members of society. It is the expression of a lingering suspicion
which is cause for most concern in respect of DNA retention. Although the targeting of certain
individuals (that is, “the usual suspects”) by the police may be unavoidable, to have it articulated and
entrenched in legislation is not acceptable in a liberal democracy.
One possible resolution to this disquiet about stigma and discrimination lies in the creation of a
“universal” database. Kaye and Smith are the foremost academic proponents of a population-wide
database with strict privacy protections,106 a suggestion which has been echoed in the United
Kingdom by Lord Justice Sedley.107 While a universal database would, by definition, moderate the
current discriminatory and stigmatising effect of selective DNA retention, and while rigorous regulation
and governance could offset privacy worries, maintaining what is in essence mass surveillance by
means of a DNA database would represent a fundamental shift in our liberal democracy. Such a
crime control mechanism would run contrary to the prevailing political principles of limited state
intervention and shift the ethos of the criminal justice system dramatically. It would be a
disproportionate means of crime control and a disproportionate reaction to concerns about
discrimination which are more appropriately dealt with by limiting rather than expanding the scope of
the database. Moreover, in a practical sense, a universal scheme would entail huge financial costs to
establish, maintain, search and safeguard such a database. So, despite the appeal of a universal
DNA database as an ostensibly non-stigmatising investigative tool, its legitimacy is undermined
critically by practical problems and, more importantly, by the implications for the State/citizen
relationship in a liberal polity. Rather than calling for the expansion of the DNA retention scheme, the
concerns I explored in this paper about privacy and stigmatisation are more effectively and readily
addressed by requiring judicial intervention before DNA retention is permitted for a limited period of
time, by improving governance, and most crucially by precluding the storage of DNA of unconvicted
persons after prosecution. While the investigate utility of a DNA database is indisputable, its
parameters must be strictly confined to safeguard the rights of innocent individuals.
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